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Deficient virtue in the Phaedo 
Abstract: In this paper I investigate two passages in the Phaedo where Socrates contrasts 
the full virtue of the philosopher with a sort deficient virtue. I argue that despite the 
apparently different appraisals Socrates offers, there is a single form of deficient virtue in 
the dialogue, one based on the calculation of bodily pleasures and pains. In the course of 
making my argument, I offer a detailed account of social virtue, a condition Plato 
mentions in several dialogues. Finally, I end by pointing out similarities between 
Phaedonic deficient virtue and Epicurus’ ethical theory that go beyond hedonism. 
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Plato seems to have been pessimistic about how most people stand with regard to virtue. 
However, unlike the Stoics, Plato did not conclude that most people are vicious. Rather, 
as we know from discussions across several dialogues, he countenanced decent ethical 
conditions that fall short of genuine virtue, which he limited to the philosopher. Despite 
Plato’s obvious interest in this issue, commentators rarely follow his lead by investigating 
in detail such conditions in the dialogues. When scholars do investigate what kind of 
virtue, if any, Plato thinks is open to non-philosophers, they typically look to the 
Republic.1 But in the Republic Plato sets out an ideal city, and so, the virtue available to 
non-philosophers there is likely different from what he thinks is available to them in the 
real world. So, if we want to determine Plato’s thoughts about the virtue of actual non-
                                                
1 For instance, see Kamtekar 1998 and Wilberding 2009. Even those treatments of non-philosophical virtue 
that do look at the Phaedo frequently do so in conjunction with this issue in the Republic. See Bobonich 
2002, ch.1, Kraut, 2012, and Vasiliou 2012. 
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philosophers, we must look elsewhere. In this paper, I set my sights on the Phaedo in 
order to do so. 
 In two passages in the Phaedo Socrates contrasts the true virtue of the philosopher 
with a deficient form of virtue available to non-philosophers. The first passage comes at 
the end of Socrates’ defense of his decision to die, and so, I’ll call it his ‘Closing 
Argument’ (68b7-69e4). In this passage Socrates compares genuine virtue with a 
counterfeit form of virtue, which I will label ‘apparent virtue’. The second passage, 
which I’ll call ‘the Reprise’2 (80c1-84b5) finds Socrates contrasting genuine virtue with 
what he calls ‘popular or social virtue,’ or, more simply, ‘social virtue’. These passages 
seem to offer quite different characterizations and evaluations of the sort of virtue 
available to non-philosophers, leading some commentators to conclude that in the Phaedo 
Plato envisages two forms of deficient virtue.3 My central task here is to determine 
whether this is so. I will argue that it is not; although these passages emphasize different 
aspects of deficient virtue, Socrates discusses a single condition in both. Hence, in the 
Phaedo there is only one form of deficient virtue. By recognizing this and considering 
these passages in conjunction, I’ll argue that we can gain a better understanding of 
Plato’s view of the virtue of non-philosophers. 
 The structure of my investigation is as follows. First, I will set out what Socrates 
says about apparent virtue and social virtue. Second, I will consider the possibility that 
these states are distinct, beginning with evidence internal to the Phaedo before turning to 
evidence from outside of the dialogue. Third, I will provide some reasons to reject the 
                                                
2 Adopting the name from Pakaluk 2003, 109. 
3 See, for instance, Vasiliou 2012.  
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evidence offered in favor of distinguishing the states, and argue that social virtue in the 
Phaedo is a species of apparent virtue. In making this case, I shall connect the Phaedo’s 
discussion of social virtue with other dialogues where the topic arises, thus offering a 
more complete account of this condition than exists in the literature. I will conclude by 
filling out the picture of deficient virtue in the dialogue. As we shall see, far from being 
philosophically implausible, the sort of deficient virtue I find in the Phaedo shares 
important points of contact with the ethical theory later developed by Epicurus. 
 
1. Preliminary discussions of apparent virtue and social virtue 
Before considering how they relate to one another, I’ll first set out what Socrates says 
about apparent virtue and social virtue. Although our central passages are certainly meant 
to complement one another, for the sake of impartiality regarding the question of how 
apparent virtue and social virtue relate, in this section I shall treat them in isolation. I 
begin, as Plato does, with apparent virtue. 
 
1.1 Apparent virtue 
Socrates introduces the topic of apparent virtue at the end of his defense. After 
concluding that a person who loves wisdom, that is a true philosopher, won’t fear death, 
he leverages this insight into the following discussion of virtue:  
 
Then, you have sufficient indication, he [Socrates] said, that any man whom you 
see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of body (φιλοσώµατος), 
being either a money lover (φιλοχρήµατος), an honor lover (φιλότιµος), or both.  
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It is certainly as you say. 
 
And, Simmias, he said, does not what is called ‘courage’ (ἡ ὀνοµαζοµένη 
ἀνδρεία) belong most (µάλιστα) to men of this disposition? 
 
Most certainly. 
 
And the quality of temperance, which even (καὶ) the majority call ‘temperance’ 
(οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνοµάζουσι σωφροσύνην), that is, not to get swept off one’s feet by 
one’s appetites, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is suited only 
(µόνοις) to those who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy? 
 
Necessarily so, he said. 
 
If you are willing to reflect on the courage and temperance of other people (τήν γε 
τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην), you will find them strange. 
 
In what way, Socrates? 
 
You know that they all consider death a great evil? 
 
Definitely, he said. 
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And the courageous among them (αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι) face death, when they do, 
for fear of greater evils. 
 
That is so. 
 
Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men courageous, except the 
philosophers. Yet, it is illogical to be courageous through fear and cowardice. 
It certainly is. 
 
What of the temperate among them (οἱ κόσµιοι αὐτῶν)? Is their experience not 
similar? Is it licentiousness of a kind that makes them temperate? We say this is 
impossible, yet their experience of this simple-minded temperance (ταύτην τὴν 
εὐήθη σωφροσύνην) turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other 
pleasures which they desire, so, they keep away from some pleasures because 
they are overcome by others. Now, to be mastered by pleasure is what they call 
licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures 
because they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, 
that in some way it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them temperate. 
 
That seems likely. 
 
Dear Simmias, I fear this is not the correct exchange with regard to virtue, that is 
exchanging pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, and fear for fear, the more for the 
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less, just as with coins. Instead, the only correct coin for which one ought to 
exchange them is wisdom. And buying and selling all of these pleasures, pains, 
and fears for this wisdom and on the side of this we have true courage, 
temperance, justice, and the whole of true virtue, which is on the side of wisdom 
regardless of whether pleasures, pains, or any such state is present or absent. But, 
exchanging these things for one another disregarding wisdom is, if you like, an 
image of virtue (σκιαγραφία), and is slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης), lacking anything 
sound or true. But, in truth, temperance, justice, and courage are a type of 
purification process and perhaps wisdom itself is a purification (68b7-69e4, 
Grube’s translation with modifications). 
 
 Since our concern lies with deficient virtue, we can sidestep questions about 
genuine virtue as Socrates describes it here. Unlike these thorny issues, many of which 
have divided commentators,4 all parties agree that the deficient virtue in this passage—
                                                
4 The most serious issue is how to understand the relationship between wisdom and virtue on offer. In 
particular, the question is whether Socrates intends to identify them, or whether he thinks they are distinct 
but that one is required for the other. Luce 1944 argues for the former view (cf. Pakaluk 2004, 109). Most 
commentators take them to be distinct and think that here wisdom is required for virtue (e.g., Gooch 1974, 
Kraut 2010, 53, and Vasiliou 2012, 20). Bobonich 2002, 16-18, 34 and Beere 2011, 254 both read this 
passage as setting out a “double role” for wisdom, as something desired for itself and because it is required 
for wisdom. Weiss 1987 (cf. Bostock 1986, 30-35 and Bluck 1955, 3-5) argues that in this passage virtue 
does not require wisdom but instead the love of wisdom. This issue is bound up with how to understand the 
two metaphors Socrates sets out in the last part of this passage. It is also bound up with how one translates 
the final sentence (“But, in truth, temperance, justice, and courage are a purification [κάθαρσίς], and 
perhaps wisdom itself is a purification [καθαρµός]”). My translation betrays my interpretation, which is 
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what I am calling ‘apparent virtue’ since Socrates says it is like an image (σκιαγραφία) of 
virtue—is based on a calculation of bodily experiences. Indeed, there is a consensus 
among commentators that the deficient virtue described here is the same as the hedonic 
calculus identified as virtue itself in the Protagoras. That the virtuous among non-
philosophers are hedonistic is obvious from the last section of this passage where they are 
said, for instance, to exchange less pleasure for more pleasure. Thus, the virtuous non-
philosophers—and indeed all non-philosophers, since all non-philosophers are body 
lovers (68b6)—use bodily experiences, including pleasure, pain, and fear,5 as the ultimate 
standard by which they judge actions, and so, are hedonists.  
 Because of the value system it reflects and reinforces, Socrates criticizes this sort 
of deficient virtue as ‘slavish’ (ἀνδραποδώδης), which indicates his judgment that it is 
ignoble and not worthy of a free adult. In the context of the Phaedo, a dialogue in which 
Socrates claims that the soul is imprisoned by the body (e.g., 82e1), this characterization 
may also carry with it the criticism that people with this sort of virtue are slaves to the 
bodily. Yet, we mustn’t allow this damning flaw to overshadow the fact that according to 
Socrates, this deficient virtue nonetheless issues in virtuous behavior. As Socrates says 
the “courageous among them [non-philosophers]” face death, and the “temperate among 
them [non-philosophers]” control certain bodily appetites. So, we can see that although it 
                                                                                                                                            
similar to Weiss’, namely, that the desire for, but not the possession of, wisdom is required for genuine 
virtue. Nothing in my present analysis relies on this interpretation, however. 
5 Throughout the dialogue Socrates treats fear, honor, and shame as a bodily experience. 
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is slavish and a sort of counterfeit form of virtue, apparent virtue does enable people to 
act virtuously.6  
 This point is worth stressing: some non-philosophers can and do perform the 
virtuous act in at least some situations and they do so on account of their apparent virtue. 
Still, their virtue is problematic for two reasons. One is that even when non-philosophers 
act virtuously, they do so without the proper motivation. Instead of acting for the sake of 
wisdom or virtue itself, they act for the sake of bodily pleasure. The other problem, which 
follows from the first, is that their apparent virtue is inherently unstable. Although non-
philosophers with apparent virtue can and do perform virtuous actions, their doing so is 
merely accidental, resulting from their calculation rather than from a proper motivation.7 
Thus, in circumstances where the calculation does not favor virtuous action, the non-
philosopher will not act well.8 Hence, although it appears that they have genuine virtue, 
what they have is merely apparent virtue.  
 Before turning to social virtue, there is another aspect of this passage to unpack. 
As we can see, Socrates does not limit his discussion to apparent virtue and genuine 
virtue. Instead, he also mentions what is called ‘courage’ and what is called ‘temperance’, 
                                                
6 Like the sticks and stones in the Recollection argument, the good actions of the apparently virtuous 
participate in opposites (e.g., in temperance and intemperance) at the same time. Cf. Barney 2005, 120. 
7 See Vasiliou 2012, 18, cf. Barney 2005, 121-124. 
8 See, for instance, the example of Gyges’ ring in the Republic.  
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which I will generalize to ‘what is called ‘virtue’’.9 Commentators rarely elaborate on 
what is called ‘virtue’, presumably because most take it to be the same as apparent 
virtue.10 This common interpretation seems plausible since clearly both apparent virtue 
and what is called ‘virtue’ fall short of genuine virtue. Furthermore, since apparent virtue 
is an image of virtue, non-philosophers undoubtedly mistake it for virtue, and so, call it 
‘virtue’.11  
 Despite the prima facie support for identifying the two, it cannot be the case that 
what is called ‘virtue’ is the same as apparent virtue. The reason is that Socrates attributes 
what are called ‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ to philosophers. As we can see in the 
passage, Socrates says that what is called ‘courage’ belongs most (µάλιστα) to the 
philosopher and that what is called ‘temperance’ belongs only (µόνοις) to the 
philosopher. So, if what are called ‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ were the same as apparent 
                                                
9 In this passage, Socrates does not mention other virtues in this same way but surely there is, for instance, 
what is called ‘justice’ and apparent justice. Indeed, as we shall see, in the Reprise Socrates mentions what 
is called ‘justice’. Moreover, if we turn to book II of the Republic, we get a discussion of what seems to be 
apparent justice that fits the pattern that we find in the Phaedo. On the popular view set out there, people 
agree to act justly because they lack the power to act unjustly, and so, acting justly seems most profitable 
(δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν, 359a1). Thus, they are acting justly out of greed or injustice. Hence, this sort of justice 
arises from its opposite, injustice. It may also be fair to speculate that the same points are implicit about 
piety in this stretch of the Republic. The conventional view of piety is characterized as permitting bribery to 
the gods so that one is released from punishment for vicious actions in life. Thus, sacrifices and offerings to 
the gods, which are surely pious actions, arise from a fundamental misunderstanding of the gods, bottoming 
out in disrespect toward them. Thus, such apparent piety also arises from its opposite, impiety. 
10 See Gallop 1975, 99 and Kraut 2010, 54. 
11 cf. Kraut 2010. 
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courage and apparent temperance, then Socrates would be attributing to the philosopher 
apparent courage and apparent temperance. But the philosopher has genuine virtue, 
which is diametrically opposed to the merely apparent and slavish virtue of non-
philosophers. So, Socrates cannot think that what is called ‘virtue’ is the same as apparent 
virtue.  
 What then is what is called ‘virtue’? Socrates outright says that what is called 
‘temperance’ is “not [getting] swept off one’s feet by one’s appetites, but [treating] them 
with disdain and orderliness” and based on his comments, what is called ‘courage’ at 
least involves willingly facing death.12 Moreover, because these conditions are what 
people call temperance and courage, respectively, it is pretty clear that in both cases they 
are what most people take these virtues to be. Thus, what is called ‘virtue’ is simply the 
common conception of virtue. It is worth noting that Socrates is not wholly critical of this 
common understanding. It seems obvious that he thinks that people get something right 
about what virtue is. But they also miss something important about it.13 In order to 
                                                
12 Rowe 1993, 146-147 concludes that what is called ‘courage’ is fearlessness in general (cf. Hackforth 
1955, 57). However, for non-philosophers, at any rate, what is called ‘courage’ is the result of a calculation 
and it is not clear how fearlessness could be the result of the sort of calculation in question. Indeed, the sort 
of calculation here likely includes fears on both sides of the ledger. And even though one fear is 
outweighed, it persists. Presumably in such cases, the non-philosopher fears the shame of acting in a 
cowardly way. However, it seems to befit a genuinely virtuous person to fear acting shamefully. So, 
perhaps what the non-philosopher fears is the negative social consequences of acting shamefully, rather 
than actually acting shamefully.  
13 Gallop 1975, 99 suggests that virtue terms are misapplied by non-philosophers. Insofar as they do not 
refer to a psychological condition, this is correct. But the many do seem to track fairly reliably which 
actions are virtuous and which are not. 
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diagnose what they are missing, we can observe that whatever precisely it is, both 
philosophers and non-philosophers can manifest, for instance, what is called ‘courage’.14 
Thus, since we know that philosophers have genuine courage but non-philosophers (at 
best) have apparent courage, this condition can result from a philosopher’s genuine 
courage or a non-philosopher’s calculation of fears. Hence, what the common 
understanding of courage neglects is the underlying psychological condition, including 
motivation, for the courageous action. The same can be said about what is called 
‘temperance’. According to the common view, temperance is controlling bodily appetites, 
regardless of why or how one is doing so.   
 I want to end this section with two further points about what is called ‘virtue’ 
before sticking a pin in this discussion. First, although not wholly misguided about what 
virtue really is, the common conception of virtue is superficial,15 since it disregards the 
underlying cognitive or conative condition of the soul.16 Second, the very fact that there 
                                                
14 Because what is called ‘courage’ applies most to the philosopher, we know that it cannot be overcoming 
fear. For, the philosopher does not fear death, and so, does not overcome fear when facing death. Despite 
the definitive textual evidence for this point, there is a debate among commentators as to whether the 
philosopher fears death when acting courageously (see Gosling and Taylor 1982, and Weiss 1989).  
15 Just as we see Socrates’ interlocutors do in so many discussions in other dialogues, non-philosophers 
here (are reported to) conceive of virtues in terms that emphasize actions—facing death and not getting 
swept away by passions—rather than in conditions in the soul that give rise to these actions. Thus, non-
philosophers think that courage just is facing death willingly, and that temperance just is not getting swept 
away by passions. 
16 Beere 2011, 280 thinks that when it comes to virtue, non-philosophers do recognize the necessity of 
acting for the right reason, they simply fail to do it. I, however, think the conception of virtue that Plato 
ascribes to them here is comparable to the conception implicit in Protagoras’ ‘Great Speech’ (Protagoras 
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is some condition that is called ‘courage’ and another that is called ‘temperance’ 
indicates that there is a consensus among most people as to what these virtues are. That 
is, even if they are incorrect about what courage and temperance are, Plato thinks that 
most people would agree about which actions are courageous and temperate. 
 
1.2 Social virtue 
In the Reprise (80c1-84b5) Socrates returns to the themes set out in his defense, arguing 
in favor of the philosophical life, though this time by considering the fate of souls after 
corporeal death. According to Socrates, unlike the souls of philosophers, which join the 
gods after corporeal death, the souls of non-philosophers don’t leave the body pure and 
ultimately return to the physical world in a new body. It is in the context of the re-
embodiment of souls that Socrates mentions social virtue. For our purposes, the most 
salient part of discussion goes as follows: 
 
The happiest of these [non-philosophers], who will also have the best destination, 
are those who have practiced popular and social virtue (οἱ τὴν δηµοτικὴν καὶ 
πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες),17 which they call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’ 
                                                                                                                                            
320c6-328d2) according to which virtue concerns only actions and not motivations. Indeed, as we shall see, 
there are significant similarities between the non-philosopher’s view of virtue in the Phaedo and 
Protagoras’ view of virtue. At any rate, even if Beere is correct, I am not convinced that non-philosophers 
would not believe someone to be genuinely temperate if she abstained from another drink tonight only in 
order to avoid a headache tomorrow. 
17 The Greek ‘πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν’ is often translated as ‘political virtue.’ This is a fine translation, but might 
mislead one into thinking this is relates to the qualities of a successful politician. However, what Socrates is 
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(ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην) and which are developed by 
habit and practice and without philosophy or understanding (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ 
µελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ). 
 
How are they the happiest? 
 
Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group either of 
bees or wasps or ants, and then again, the same kind of human group, and so be 
average (µέτριος) people. 
 
That is likely. 
 
No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and 
is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lovers of 
learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who 
practice philosophy in the right way keep away from bodily passions, master 
them, and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting 
their substance and of poverty, which the majority, i.e., money lovers (οἱ πολλοὶ 
καὶ φιλοχρήµατοι) fear, nor for fear of dishonor or ill repute, like the ambitious 
lovers of honors (οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιµοι), that they keep away from them. 
(82a6-c6, Grube’s translation with modifications) 
                                                                                                                                            
getting at here are the qualities that lead someone to be a good member of the polis, which is why such 
people come back as social creatures. 
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 Before considering how social virtue relates to apparent virtue, I want to call 
attention to four points in this passage. First, Socrates says people with social virtue are 
the happiest (εὐδαιµονέστατοι) of non-philosophers and that they will have the best 
destination after death. Thus, not only will they have the best experience of non-
philosophers after death, it seems that their social virtue provides for them the best 
(embodied) life possible for non-philosophers. Second, Socrates says that social virtue is 
what people call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’ (ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ 
δικαιοσύνην). Thus, the names ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’ as employed by non-
philosophers at any rate, refer to social virtue. Hence, social virtue is comprised of what 
non-philosophers call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’. That is, non-philosophers aren’t 
reported here to call temperance and justice ‘social virtue’, but rather what they call 
‘temperance’ and ‘justice’ is social virtue. Third, Socrates says that social virtue arises in 
the non-philosophers who have it as a result of habit and practice, not through philosophy 
and understanding (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ µελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ). 
Thus, these conditions are developed, and so presumably settle into the soul, absent the 
relevant cognitive aspect(s) required for genuine virtue.  
 The final point to mention about this passage is that it ends with Socrates 
contrasting the motivations of the philosopher for mastering bodily passion with the 
motivations of non-philosophers for doing so. According to Socrates, philosophers keep 
away from bodily passions, master them, and do not surrender to them because they 
know that the soul must be pure when it leaves the body. Non-philosophers who control 
bodily passions, on the other hand, seem to fall into one of two groups, with motivations 
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that correspond to their characters. One group of non-philosophers, money lovers,18 
avoids bodily passions (when they do) for fear of wasting their resources, while the other 
group, the honor lovers, does so for fear of dishonor and bad reputation. Given the way 
he talks here, there can be little doubt that Socrates is discussing acting temperately. 
However, it is less than clear whether he is here still thinking about social virtue, or has 
reverted to the topic of apparent temperance, or whether he thinks social virtue and 
apparent virtue are the same, and hence, he is thinking about both. So, I want to turn now 
to this investigation. 
 
2. The case for distinguishing apparent virtue and social virtue 
Having seen what Socrates says about apparent virtue and social virtue, we are now in 
position to investigate how they relate to one another. This discussion will span the next 
two sections. In the present section I will offer evidence that apparent virtue and social 
virtue are distinct. As we shall see, evidence for this interpretation comes from the 
Phaedo itself but we find perhaps the most persuasive support for it in the Republic.  
 Based on the foregoing, there are several reasons to think that apparent virtue 
differs from social virtue. First, Socrates seems to evaluate apparent virtue differently 
than he does social virtue.19 Whereas he disparages apparent virtue, criticizing it as 
slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης), Socrates seems to esteem social virtue, saying that those who 
                                                
18 Socrates says “the many kai money-lovers,” which may suggest that these are two distinct groups. But he 
is best understood as describing the many as body lovers, which suggests an epexegetical use of kai 
reflected in my translation. A close alternative is that Socrates is saying “the many who are money lovers,” 
which leaves open that some of the many are money lovers and some of the many are honor lovers. 
19 See Vasiliou 2012, 17-18. 
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possess it will be the happiest of the non-philosophers and that they will enjoy the best 
fates after death. Thus, given these different appraisals, it seems that Socrates thinks 
apparent virtue and social virtue are different states.  
 Second, while Socrates says that social virtue is developed by habit and practice, 
he does not indicate that this is the case for apparent virtue. And given what we know 
about the condition, it seems possible that it is not even the sort of state that is acquired. 
That is, because it amounts to trading bodily experiences for other bodily experiences, it 
may be the default state, such that it is what we begin with and maintain, unless we 
acquire some other condition, like social virtue.  
 Socrates’ claim that social virtue comes from habit and practice but not 
philosophy or understanding has led some commentators to conclude that it consists in 
true beliefs about the intrinsic value of virtue.20 The thought is that the most likely 
candidate for what is habituated in the socially virtuous is a set of true, stable beliefs 
about virtue. If this interpretation is correct, then it is a third, and decisive, difference 
between social virtue and apparent virtue. Although apparent virtue enables someone to 
act virtuously, it is neither stable nor does it consist in beliefs about virtue itself.21 But 
according to the interpretation on offer, social virtue does involve true and stable beliefs 
about virtue, which then motivate the socially virtuous agent to act in accordance with 
these beliefs, and so, act virtuously.  
                                                
20 See Kraut 2010, 56.  
21 The hedonic calculation of apparent virtue will issue in true beliefs about which available action is 
virtuous in a situation. So, perhaps it results in true beliefs about which actions are virtuous (whether or not 
these are beliefs about the actions as virtuous). But, as I discuss below, it is not about the intrinsic value of 
virtue. 
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 There is, however, no indication in the Phaedo that people with social virtue have 
any beliefs about virtue, stable, true, or otherwise. But if we leave the Phaedo and turn to 
the Republic, we can find support for this view. In the Republic at 429b4-430c4, as part 
of a larger attempt to identify the virtues in a city, Socrates and Glaucon discuss courage. 
According to Socrates, one type of courage is the power of preservation of the belief 
about what should be feared and not abandoning it in the face of pains, pleasures, desires, 
or fears (430b1-2). Furthermore, this courage preserves a correct (ὀρθῆς) belief that is 
inculcated by laws (νοµίµου). Importantly for our purposes, Socrates says that this is the 
definition of social courage (πολιτικήν γε, 430c4).22 Thus, it seems that Socrates is here 
evoking the same distinction between social virtue and genuine virtue that he stakes out 
in the Reprise. And since social virtue as discussed here in the Republic seems to consist 
in true, stable beliefs about virtue, there is reason to think that this is also the case in the 
Phaedo. And if this is the case, and social virtue consists in true beliefs about virtue, then 
it must be distinct from apparent virtue. 
 So, this passage from the Republic supplies the evidence absent from the Phaedo 
that social virtue consists in true beliefs about virtue. Importantly, it seems to provide 
further, even more explicit evidence that social virtue is distinct from apparent virtue in 
the Phaedo. In this passage, Glaucon, with the approval of Socrates, contrasts social 
courage with a state that consists in correct beliefs about what is to be feared but that 
does not come from education and has nothing to do with the law. For our purposes, it is 
                                                
22 In the Reprise, Socrates refers to ‘popular and social virtue’ (τὴν δηµοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) but 
here only to ‘social’ courage. Nothing seems to ride on the exclusion of ‘δηµοτικός’ in this passage, 
though. 
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relevant that Glaucon says that this state is found in animals and slavish people 
(ἀνδραποδώδη). Of course, as we have seen, at the end of his Closing Argument, 
Socrates criticizes apparent virtue as slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης, 69b6). Thus, it seems that 
Plato has the same sort of state in mind in both passages, namely, apparent virtue.23 The 
upshot of this is the following. In the Republic Plato distinguishes between what he calls 
‘social’ courage and slavish courage. Generalizing from courage to virtue, in the Republic 
there is a distinction between social virtue and slavish virtue. And since in the Phaedo 
Plato discusses social virtue and slavish (i.e., apparent) virtue, there is reason to think that 
he likewise distinguishes them in that dialogue.  
 
3. Social virtue is a species of apparent virtue  
According to the evidence we have just considered, it seems that there is good reason to 
think that apparent and social virtue are distinct. On this interpretation, unlike people 
with apparent virtue, who deal only in bodily pleasure and pain, people with social virtue 
are motivated by virtue and perform (or refrain from) certain actions because of their 
beliefs about virtue.24 Although this reading has its appeal, I believe that in the Phaedo 
                                                
23 See Irwin 1995, 194-195, 234. Cf. Kamtekar 1998, 5.   
24 Vasiliou 2012 sets out this view in detail (cf. Vasiliou 2008, esp. chapter 8, sections 2 and 3). I disagree 
with his view in part because I disagree that apparent and social virtue are distinct. But even setting this 
aspect of his view aside, I think there is good reason to resist Vasiliou’s account. In particular, Vasiliou 
denies that the philosopher in the Phaedo possesses genuine virtue but possesses instead social virtue (15-
16, 24). However, there are two pieces of evidence that should convince us to attribute to the Phaedonic 
philosopher genuine virtue. First, 83e4 Socrates explicitly says that philosophers are temperate and just 
(τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα οἱ δικαίως φιλοµαθεῖς κόσµιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι), which suggests that they possess 
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social virtue is not distinct from apparent virtue, but is instead a species of apparent 
virtue. In this section I will make the case for this claim. I shall begin by reassessing the 
evidence that favors distinguishing social virtue from apparent virtue, all of which is open 
to question. In contrast, there is very strong reason to think that in the Phaedo social 
virtue is a form of apparent virtue. Accordingly, I will end this section by offering 
positive reason to think that social virtue is a form of apparent virtue.  
 
3.1 Reassessing the evidence that apparent and social virtue are distinct 
The first reason considered above for distinguishing apparent and social virtue was that 
whereas Socrates seems to disparage the former, referring to it as an image of true virtue 
and calling it slavish, he seems positive about the latter, saying that its possessors are the 
happiest of non-philosophers.25 In fact, though, this reason is rather weak, since these 
different evaluations are consistent with one another. That is, Socrates can at the same 
time maintain that some person has a condition that is slavish and that that person is the 
happiest of all non-philosophers. Rather than betraying an inconsistency within Socrates’ 
beliefs, it may simply reflect Socrates’ low opinion a life without philosophy.26 Indeed, in 
                                                                                                                                            
these, and presumably all other, virtues. Second, Socrates says that philosophers will join the gods after 
death (69c5-d6, 82b7-c2, 114c3), but that souls with social virtue are reincarnated (82b4). Thus, Socrates 
must think that the philosophers of the Phaedo do not merely have social virtue but have genuine virtue. 
25 It is worth pointing out that Kraut 2010, 56 does not take Socrates’ use of ‘σκιαγραφία’ to be as strong a 
condemnation as most commentators do. Instead, Kraut interprets it to suggest a “thin” and 
“underdeveloped” understanding of virtue.  
26 Compare with Diotima’s (and so Socrates’) claim that gazing at the Beautiful, if anywhere, is where 
human life is worth living (Symposium, 211d2-3). 
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the context of his Closing Argument, Socrates says that apparent virtue is fit for a slave 
and is an image of true virtue to highlight and stress the value of genuine virtue. In the 
Reprise, though, the relevant contrast is not between deficient virtue and genuine virtue 
but is between non-philosophers with deficient virtue and non-philosophers who lack it.27 
That is, in the Reprise, Socrates’ point is that given the pitiful state of non-philosophers, 
those with apparent virtue—despite its deficiency in comparison with genuine virtue—
are still in a better condition than those who do not possess it.28  
 Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that Socrates does not say that people with 
social virtue are happy, but only says that they are the happiest (εὐδαιµονέστατοι) of non-
philosophers. Although this may seem to indicate that they are happy, it does not. In 
Greek as well as in English, the claim that someone is the happiest member of some 
group is consistent with that person being unhappy. And given that Socrates has just 
claimed that a person can only be happy when she is with the divine, immortal, and wise 
(81a4), he mustn’t think that people with social virtue are happy, in life or in the afterlife. 
So, all Socrates is saying when he calls those with social virtue the happiest of non-
philosophers is that given the miserable condition of other non-philosophers, those with 
                                                
27 It seems that even in the earlier passage, not everything Socrates says about apparent virtue is 
condemnation. For he calls the temperance of (at least some) non-philosophers εὐήθη, which can mean 
‘naïve.’ Indeed, he later uses it to refer to himself at 100d4, and Thrasymachus says it of him in the 
Republic at 349b. 
28 This is so if only because people with apparent virtue are the least likely of non-philosophers to act 
viciously.  
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social virtue are the happiest, at least by being the least miserable.29 Again, this is all 
consistent with this condition being slavish, as given that humans are capable of genuine 
virtue, anything short of it is not worthy of them.30 
 The second reason we considered for distinguishing social and apparent virtue 
was that Socrates says the former arises from habit and practice but doesn’t say the same 
about the latter. This reason is defeasible, though, because we cannot infer from different 
origins to different conditions. This is clear if we consider other cases where a single 
condition can arise from desperate sources. For instance, some people might be naturally 
disposed to having a low resting heart rate, while others have to train extensively to attain 
one. Or, for a Platonic example, in Book VI of the Republic Socrates indicates that there 
are two ways for someone naturally inclined to philosophy to develop into a genuine 
philosopher: guidance from philosophical rulers in a well-ordered state, or divine 
dispensation (492e5-7).  
 There is further reason to doubt that Socrates’ claim supports distinguishing 
apparent and social virtue. As noted above, Socrates never says how one acquires 
                                                
29 Thus, I think that Kraut 2010, 54-55 overstates the case in writing that those with social virtue are not 
only praiseworthy for their virtuous actions, but because of their virtuous intentions. There is nothing in the 
text that suggests that they have such motivations, and indeed, textual evidence suggests that they perform 
virtuous actions aiming at pleasure and avoiding pain. And although Kraut is correct to point out that 
Socrates does not think that most people are exceedingly vicious, this does not require that Socrates believe 
that most people have virtuous motivations. It can be enough that they perform virtuous actions. Indeed, it 
is the actions—both good and bad—for which souls are rewarded/punished in the afterlife (113e1). 
30 Especially if ‘slavish’ is meant to capture that such the souls are enslaved to the body and its desires, as 
suggested above. 
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apparent virtue. Thus, he says nothing to rule out the possibility that apparent virtue, like 
social virtue, arises from habit and practice. And, based on what we can tease out from 
what Socrates says, I believe we have reason to believe that apparent virtue, like social 
virtue, results from habit and practice. To see this, recall that apparent virtue involves the 
exchange of pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, and fears for fears. But now consider 
what a successful exchange of, for instance, one pleasure for another pleasure would 
require. Surely it would require that the person give up one pleasure for another pleasure. 
But an exchange of pleasure need not require that both pleasures are present to the 
person. That is to say, although one of the pleasures involved in the exchange might be 
present, the other pleasure might be in the future. Furthermore, recall that the person with 
apparent virtue can act virtuously; the person with apparent courage can face death, and 
the person with apparent temperance can resist her appetites. Of course, when they do so, 
they are acting on account of fears and pleasures or pains, but they nonetheless act 
virtuously. And it is important to realize that not everyone does. After all, Socrates makes 
a point of saying “the courageous among them” and “the temperate among them”, which 
indicates that only some non-philosophers have apparent courage or apparent 
temperance. Thus, while some non-philosophers do exchange pleasures for other 
pleasures, others, perhaps most, do not.31 What could explain the difference? After all, as 
                                                
31 Bobonich 2002, 485 claims all non-philosophers engage in the wrong exchange, and that this is sufficient 
for apparent virtue. This results in the unwelcome conclusion that all non-philosophers have apparent 
virtue. Of course, even non-philosophers without apparent virtue give up certain pleasures by indulging in 
other pleasures. But they do not exchange (καταλλάσσω) any pleasures, as an exchange requires that one 
has the pleasures in hand and then trades them away, rather than simply losing out on them (cf. Bailly 
2011: 296). Thus, all non-philosophers trade in bodily pleasures, but not all exchange them. 
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body lovers, the person with apparent temperance and the person who lacks it both desire 
and value bodily pleasure. So, their ultimate desires and valuations cannot be the 
difference. But for some reason the person who lacks apparent temperance does not 
exchange one pleasure for another. The most likely explanation for this difference is that 
the person who lacks apparent temperance gives in to the present pleasure and so does 
not effect an exchange. In contrast, the person with apparent temperance does not give in 
to the present pleasure, but instead resists it and successfully exchanges it for a greater 
pleasure, likely in the future. Importantly for our purposes, doing so requires self-control, 
the very sort of ability that one has to develop and train.32 And since not every non-
philosopher has it, and it does not come from wisdom,33 this ability to resist present 
pleasure, and so engage an exchange of pleasures—that is, to have apparent virtue—must 
come from practice and habit. Hence, a proper understanding of apparent virtue suggests 
that like social virtue, it comes from habit and practice.34   
 So much then for the possibility that apparent and social virtue have different 
origins. But there is still the third reason above, namely, the possibility that social virtue 
                                                
32 Perhaps some people have it naturally, but at the very least, it is the sort of condition that can be 
developed through practice and habit. Indeed, although Protagoras argues in his great speech that virtue can 
be taught, his notion of teaching seems much closer to inculcation through practice and habit, rather than 
anything straightforwardly cognitive. See Barney 2005, 120.  
33 Body lovers in the Phaedo do not care about or possess wisdom. Hence, their apparent virtue does not 
come from the art of measurement as described in the Protagoras.  
34 This does not undermine the claim that the apparent virtues also come from vices. The ability to engage 
in a profitable exchange of bodily pleasures might come from habit, but that does not mean that it also is 
not still vicious.  
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consists in true beliefs about the value of virtue. As noted above, the Phaedo itself 
provides us with no evidence for this view, but the Republic does. Recall that because the 
Republic distinguishes between social courage and slavish courage, it seems to provide 
conclusive evidence that social virtue is distinct from slavish (i.e., apparent) virtue in the 
Phaedo. As I shall now argue, though, if properly understood, this passage does not 
warrant this conclusion.   
 In short, despite employing similar vocabulary, there is good reason to doubt that 
the passages are concerned with the same states.35 Let’s begin with the condition that 
Glaucon in the Republic calls ‘slavish’. Although Socrates does apply the same term—
‘ἀνδραποδώδης’—to apparent virtue in the Phaedo, there is reason to think the 
conditions to which this term applies are not the same. As we know, apparent virtue in 
the Phaedo is characterized by exchanging bodily pleasures and pains for other bodily 
pleasures and pains. However, there is no indication—aside, perhaps, from the term 
‘slavish’—that this is the case for the courage Plato has in mind in this section of the 
Republic. The type of courage mentioned in the Republic is instead characterized by a 
lack of education, in contrast with social courage, which is inculcated through education 
and the law.36 Thus, it looks like in this Republic passage, Plato may be referring to 
something other than the apparent courage of the Phaedo. In fact, there is evidence in this 
                                                
35 Alternatively, even if they are the same states, Plato has either changed his view of these states, or is 
presenting them in such a different way, that the Republic passage cannot inform us about these states as 
presented in the Phaedo. Cf. Archer-Hind 1883, Appendix I.  
36 See Kamtekar 1998, 5 for the same point. Although we ultimately agree that slavish courage in the 
Republic differs from the hedonic-based slavish courage in the Phaedo, Kamtekar takes the Republic 
version to be the result of fear of punishment, rather than rashness as I suggest here.  
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passage of the Republic that Plato is thinking of rashness. For, in addition to saying that it 
is slavish, Glaucon also compares it to the courage found in animals (θηριώδη). While 
such a description is notably absent from the Phaedo passage, it is present elsewhere in 
the corpus. In particular, we see it at Laches 197b, where Nicias distinguishes between 
courage and rashness (θρασύτης). For our purposes, it is significant that Nicias says that 
the latter is possessed by animals (as well as by children) but he does not appear to be 
ascribing to animals (or children) the hedonic calculus characteristic of apparent virtue.37 
More importantly, the very idea of rashness, which is characterized by haste and a lack of 
reflection, runs contrary to any sort of hedonic calculus, which requires consideration.38 
Furthermore, Nicias characterizes rashness as a condition that lacks sense (ἄνοια), not 
one that aims at pleasure.39 This is similar to what Glaucon says in the Republic, as he is 
talking about a condition mistaken for courage40 that comes about without learning. 
Accordingly, although all three passages—the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Laches 
                                                
37 He also reports that people confuse rashness for courage, which might be interpreted as an indication that 
the condition that Socrates identifies as what is called ‘courage’ in the Phaedo is rashness. However, this 
cannot be the case, since as we have seen, what is called ‘courage’ applies (most) to those with genuine 
courage (i.e., philosophers) but Nicias claims that rashness opposes genuine courage.  
38 Moreover, actions like facing death in order to protect cubs, which are popularly attributed to lions—one 
of the animals mentioned in the Laches discussion (196e3)—are not typically considered hedonistic. See 
also Symposium 207a5–c1 where animals are described as acting for the sake of love, willing to die and 
face starvation for their offspring.  
39 Socrates does say that apparent courage is illogical (ἄλογος, 68d11) in the Phaedo but this is because it 
comes from its opposite, rather than because it senseless. 
40 Glaucon claims that he is sure that Socrates does not make this mistake, which implies that others do. 
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passages—discuss a condition mistaken for courage, it seems like the Phaedo discussion 
of apparent courage is the odd one out, differing as it does from the other two.41 
 If the foregoing is correct, then we have reason to doubt that slavish courage in 
the Republic is the same as apparent courage in the Phaedo. Hence, we have reason to 
doubt that this passage of the Republic draws the same contrast between apparent virtue 
and social virtue found in the Phaedo. But this still leaves the possibility that the social 
courage from this passage of the Republic is the same as the social virtue in the Phaedo. 
And if this were the case, then there would be reason to think that in the Phaedo Plato 
distinguishes between social virtue and apparent virtue. On this suggestion, social virtue 
in the Phaedo would be the same as social virtue in the Republic. And since social virtue 
in the Republic is surely not the same as apparent virtue in the Phaedo,42 it would follow 
that social virtue in the Phaedo is not the same as apparent virtue. However, I think there 
is good reason to doubt that social courage in the Republic passage maps onto social 
virtue in the Phaedo.  
 One reason is that in the Republic Socrates’ qualification (i.e., πολιτικήν γε) of the 
condition I have been referring to as ‘social courage’ indicates that he is talking about the 
courage of the city (polis), in contrast to human courage. Indeed, at this point in the 
discussion in the Republic Socrates is focused exclusively on the virtues as they are 
manifested in the city.43 So, when properly situated, the passage seems to suggest that 
                                                
41 Plato’s view need not be inconsistent across the three passages, as the mistake may well lie with the 
many who have an incorrect and inconsistent conception of courage. Indeed, as Aristotle discusses in NE 
3.8, many different states are often mistaken for courage. 
42 Cf. Barney 2005, 120. 
43 See Kamtekar 1998, fn. 8 and Sedley 2013, fn 25.  
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Socrates means that social, or better yet in this context, political, courage is what makes a 
city, not any individual, courageous. However, since it is clear that the social virtue of the 
Phaedo belongs to individuals, it seems that it cannot be the same as the social/political 
courage of this part of the Republic. 
 In response, one might argue that although Socrates is referring to the courage of 
the city in this Republic passage, since this courage ultimately relies on the courage of the 
auxiliaries, he really does have in mind a sort of courage that resides in individuals. But 
even if this is so—and we grant that social courage in the Republic really is a type of 
human courage—there are still reasons to deny that social courage in the Republic is the 
same sort of virtue we find in the Phaedo. First, social courage in the Republic is 
inculcated differently than Phaedonic social virtue is. As we have seen, in the Republic 
social courage is the result of education (παιδεία). But in the Phaedo social virtue is the 
result of habit and practice (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ µελέτης) without understanding (ἄνευ νοῦ).44 
Thus, whereas social courage in the Republic necessarily has a cognitive element, this is 
not the case with social virtue in the Phaedo, which might suggest that they are different 
psychological conditions.45  
                                                
44 In the Myth of Er at the end of the Republic Socrates does mention people who “participated in virtue 
through habit and without philosophy” (619d1). Vasiliou 2012, 9 takes this to be the same sort of state as 
referred to as ‘social courage’ at 430b. However, given that in the Myth of Er these people participate in 
virtue through habit, it seems more likely that they are the people with social virtue in the Phaedo (cf. 
Barney 2005, 120). Hence, I disagree with Broadie 2005, 100 that the people mentioned in this bit of the 
Myth of Er are genuinely virtuous.  
45 In his translation of the Republic Paul Shorey suggests in a note at 430b that Plato has four grades of 
courage, the middle two of which are social courage. Shorey maintains that the higher of the two is 
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 Another reason is that there does not seem to be any room for social courage in 
the Phaedo, as social virtue appears to be exhausted by what is called ‘temperance’ and 
‘justice’. Recall that Socrates says, “The happiest of these [non-philosophers]… are those 
who have practiced popular and social virtue, which they call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’” 
(82b1). Thus, he seems to restrict social virtue, in this context at any rate, to some kind of 
temperance and some kind of justice. That is, he indicates that social virtue simply is 
what people call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’. So, there does not appear to be the possibility 
of social courage in the Phaedo, which suggests that the Republic passage is about some 
other sort of state, albeit with a similar gloss. 
 One might object that Socrates’ omission of courage at Phaedo 82d1 does not rule 
out a form of social courage comparable to social temperance and social justice. 
However, there is good evidence from elsewhere in the corpus that social virtue in its 
primary sense is limited to temperance and justice.46 Perhaps the most striking and 
certainly the most extended example can be found in the Protagoras during Protagoras’ 
‘great speech’ (320c6-328d2). Throughout this speech Protagoras refers to temperance 
                                                                                                                                            
described in this passage, leaving open the possibility that the lower form, which is perhaps lower because 
it is not the result of education, is what we find in the Phaedo. 
46 Hence, we would have to conclude that in the Republic what is glossed as ‘social courage’ does not fit in 
with what is meant by ‘social virtue’ in some other dialogues, at least dialogues that pre-date the Republic. 
However, it seems plausible that even in the Republic strictly speaking social virtue is limited to 
temperance and justice. At 500d5 Socrates refers to ‘temperance, justice, and the whole of δηµοτικῆς 
virtue.’ Recall that in the Phaedo Socrates employs the same word when identifying social virtue (“τὴν 
δηµοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν”). Thus, even in the Republic Plato appears to limit what we have been 
calling ‘social virtue’ to temperance and justice. For a similar observation, see Kahn 1996, 217-218 (though 
also see 223) and Adkins 1960 passim. 
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and justice as ‘social virtue’, but never mentions courage, as a virtue, as a part of social 
virtue, or as a part of the political art.47 Thus, it seems that on Protagoras’ understanding, 
which Socrates does not challenge, social virtue is restricted to temperance and justice.48  
 If we turn to the end of Diotima’s speech in the Symposium we find a similar 
discussion. Diotima does not explicitly identify temperance and justice with social virtue, 
but she does characterize them as dealing with the proper ordering of cities and 
households (209a5), which is precisely how Protagoras identifies social virtue prior to his 
speech (319a1). Thus, there seems to be agreement across the Protagoras and Symposium 
regarding social virtue, in particular in identifying it with forms of temperance and 
justice. Moreover, at the very end of her speech, Diotima contrasts this social virtue with 
the genuine virtue of the philosopher. In fact, she implies that the social virtue of the best 
non-philosophers is an image of virtue (212a4, εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς), which, of course, is 
                                                
47 He does mention cowardice but indicates that the way to avoid it is to keep one’s body fit (326c1). Thus, 
courage is quite unlike the other virtues Protagoras discusses. Indeed, Protagoras confirms that this is his 
view—which is itself likely a reflection of the popular view—late in the discussion: “What I am saying to 
you, Socrates, is that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them [wisdom, temperance, piety, 
and justice] are reasonably close to each other, courage is completely different from all the rest” (349d2-3, 
Lombardo and Bell translation). 
48 Two further points relating Protagoras’ view with what we find in the Phaedo. First, given that the 
Protagoras ends with Socrates and Protagoras identifying virtue with hedonic calculation, we can 
tentatively conclude that the same goes for social virtue discussed in his speech. This would indicate that 
like apparent virtue, social virtue is based on hedonic calculation. Second, as noted above, the ‘teaching’ 
advocated by Protagoras seems much more like training and habit-forming, which is precisely how social 
virtue in the Phaedo is inculcated. This sort of teaching is importantly different from the education 
responsible for social courage in the Republic, which is instituted by the rulers and so is based on wisdom.  
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similar to what Socrates says about apparent virtue in his Closing Argument, calling it 
‘σκιαγραφία’ of true virtue. Thus, in the Symposium Plato unflatteringly describes social 
virtue—again limited to temperance and justice—in the same way he does apparent 
virtue in the Phaedo.  
 By investigating these two passages from other dialogues,49 we see that Plato—
perhaps following common usage—restricts social virtue to temperance and justice. 
Thus, we have reason to think that Plato is employing this same notion of social virtue in 
the Phaedo, where it is once again limited to temperance and justice. This, in turn, gives 
us good reason to think that the discussion of social courage in the Republic is 
importantly different from the discussion of social virtue in the Phaedo. Hence, there is 
good reason to think that this passage from the Republic does not shed relevant light on 
the relationship between apparent virtue and social virtue in the Phaedo. Accordingly, 
even if we understand the Republic passage as contrasting social courage with a type of 
slavish courage, this gives us no reason to think apparent virtue differs from social virtue 
in the Phaedo. It also means that the characterization of social courage in the Republic is 
not the same as social virtue in the Phaedo. Moreover, by considering the passages from 
the Protagoras and Symposium, we have at least some reason to think that social virtue in 
the Phaedo is importantly related to apparent temperance and apparent justice. As I shall 
now argue, there is sufficient reason from within the Phaedo itself to draw the same 
conclusion. 
 
 
                                                
49 To these two we could also add Republic 500d5, mentioned above (fn. 46).  
 31 
3.2 Social virtue is apparent temperance and apparent justice 
I have just argued that the evidence does not warrant distinguishing between apparent 
virtue and social virtue in the Phaedo. In this section I want to offer further positive 
evidence that they are not distinct states. As we have just seen, in other Platonic 
discussions, social virtue is restricted to some form of temperance and justice.50 
Accordingly, I will argue that likewise, in the Phaedo social virtue is apparent 
temperance and apparent justice.51 
  I believe decisive evidence that social virtue is a species of apparent virtue comes 
in the Reprise when Socrates identifies what motivates non-philosophers to act 
temperately. As we have seen, shortly after mentioning social virtue, Socrates contrasts 
the philosopher’s motivations for avoiding bodily passions with the motivations of the 
money lover and the honor lover. Because it is important, I will again quote in full:  
 
                                                
50 Irwin 1995, 384 argues that social virtue is a species of apparent virtue, but maintains that it is a superior 
type of apparent virtue, and presumably thinks that it includes a form of courage. This would mean that 
social virtue is apparent virtue plus some additional positive feature. The most likely candidate for this 
additional feature would be a concern for virtue itself. However, as we shall see, since all non-philosophers 
are body lovers, which means that they ultimately value only bodily pleasure (including honor), there is no 
room for them to care about virtue in itself. Accordingly, there does not seem to be any space for the view 
that social virtue is a superior species of apparent virtue.  
51 Strictly speaking, social virtue is ‘what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’’, which, as we have seen, 
refers more to actions than full character states. However, since Socrates is talking about non-philosophers 
who participate in what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’, we know that they have merely apparent 
temperance and justice. 
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No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and 
who is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of 
learning. It is for this reason, my friends, Simmias and Cebes, that those who 
practice philosophy in the right way keep away from bodily appetites, master 
them, and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for the fear of 
wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority, i.e., the money lovers 
fear, nor for the fear of dishonor, and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of 
honor, that they keep away from them. 
 
Two features of this passage support my interpretation of social virtue. One is that 
although Socrates does not explicitly mention temperance here, it is clear that he is 
referring to it. Socrates’ characterization of “mastering and not surrendering” to bodily 
appetites recalls the earlier definition of what is called ‘temperance,’ namely “not to get 
swept off one’s feet by one’s appetites” (68c6-d1), as well as his earlier claim that people 
with apparent temperance “master certain pleasures” (69a1). And, as when he discusses 
apparent virtue earlier, he is here allowing that non-philosophers can act temperately, but 
that they do so for reasons relating to other bodily desires.52  
 The other feature of this passage that supports my interpretation is Socrates’ 
mention of money lovers and honor lovers. Socrates’ previous claims commit him to 
including people with social virtue among the money lovers and honor lovers. Recall that 
                                                
52 Note that although honor lovers are more closely associated with apparent courage than they are with 
apparent temperance, Socrates is not describing honor lovers acting courageously at the end of this passage; 
he is describing honor lovers acting temperately on account of shame and ambition. 
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he earlier identifies money lovers and honor lovers as species of body lovers (68c1). And 
he also claims that if someone is not a philosopher, then she is a body lover (68b6). Thus, 
all non-philosophers, including those with social virtue, are either money lovers or honor 
lovers (or both). Thus, even those people with social virtue act temperately for the 
reasons Socrates here contrasts with philosophical reasons. And as we know, in his 
Closing Argument Socrates identifies apparent virtue as dealing with exchanging bodily 
pleasures for other bodily pleasures. Hence, because social virtue also involves this very 
same exchange, it must be the case that social virtue is the same as, or at least a species 
of, apparent virtue.53 And since we know that social virtue is what people call 
‘temperance’ and ‘justice’, we can conclude that social virtue is a species of apparent 
virtue, namely, apparent temperance and apparent justice.54 
 
4. An account of apparent virtue 
I have argued that in the Phaedo social virtue is a species of apparent virtue. Thus, in the 
Phaedo apparent virtue is the only form of deficient virtue. This means that the only form 
                                                
53 See Irwin 1977, 162, 322 and Irwin 1995, 235 (fn. 16). 
54 If this is correct, one might wonder why Socrates thinks that those with social virtue in particular (and 
not apparent virtue in general) are the happiest of non-philosophers. I suggest that Socrates must think that 
it is possible for someone to have apparent courage without having apparent temperance or apparent 
justice, and vice versa. And given what it might take to possess apparent courage—a control over fear—it 
is plausible that someone with this condition is more likely to act viciously or violently—perhaps out of 
anger—than someone with apparent temperance and apparent justice, which requires control over appetites. 
Thus, it seems likely that there is not a unity of apparent virtue, and that those who only possess apparent 
courage are more likely to act viciously than those with apparent temperance and justice. 
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of virtue open to non-philosophers is based on a hedonic calculation.55 This is a 
worthwhile conclusion on its own, but before ending, I want to develop a more complete 
characterization of apparent virtue. In order to do so, I will try to determine Plato’s 
considered evaluation of deficient virtue in the Phaedo. In addition, I will examine in 
more detail the motivations of agents with apparent virtue. I’ll begin with the latter. 
 My particular interest here is whether people with apparent virtue are motivated 
by virtue or conceive of their actions as virtuous. In the course of investigating the 
relationship between social virtue and apparent virtue, I considered a version of this 
thesis. The view entertained was that people with social virtue possess and act on beliefs 
about the intrinsic value of virtue. Thus, on this view, these agents conceive of their 
actions as virtuous and are motivated by virtue. Although we saw that there is no direct 
evidence that this is how to understand social virtue in the Phaedo, we can now consider 
the possibility that some apparently virtuous agents—not necessarily only those with 
social virtue—do conceive of their actions as virtuous.56 Of course, because all non-
philosophers are body lovers, and so motivated only by bodily pleasure and pain, they 
                                                
55 Because the philosopher pursues wisdom and virtue, which is pleasurable, some commentators have 
argued that she too is a hedonist (e.g., Gosling and Taylor 1982). However, there is no indication at all in 
the dialogue that the philosopher is motivated by wisdom and virtue because of pleasure (cf. See Weiss 
1989 and Shorey 1971, 30). Indeed, this runs contrary to the picture we get of the philosopher throughout 
the dialogue.  
56 For this understanding of apparent virtue, see Bobonich 2002, 17. Kraut 2010, 55 claims that non-
philosophers have conflicting beliefs about virtue, but thinks that one of the beliefs is that virtue is valuable 
in itself. 
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would never be motivated by virtue itself.57 Simply put, non-philosophers do not think 
that virtue is intrinsically valuable, and so virtue alone cannot motivate them. But might a 
non-philosopher value virtue instrumentally? That is, could a non-philosopher value 
virtue insofar as she believed that virtue always maximizes pleasure, at least in the long 
term? If the answer is ‘yes’, then a person with apparent virtue could conceive of an 
action as virtuous and so perform it on account of that belief.  
 In order to determine whether or not this is a live possibility, we must recall the 
two points made about what is called ‘virtue’ at the end of §1.1. First, non-philosophers 
have a superficial conception of what virtue is, one that focuses on actions but misses out 
on what virtue really is. Thus, because they do not grasp what virtue is, a non-philosopher 
could conceive of an action as virtuous without that conception providing her with any 
motivation to act. Accordingly, it is certainly possible that some people with apparent 
virtue do conceive of their actions as virtuous. This is because if they did in fact 
understand what genuine virtue is, they would understand that it outstrips the value of 
bodily pleasure, and so, be motivated by it. However, since they do not understand 
genuine virtue, they can believe that an action is virtuous—based on their superficial 
understanding of virtue—and fail to be motivated by this belief. 
 The second point is that there is, in fact, a general consensus among non-
philosophers about what virtue is. That is, given that all, or at least most, non-
                                                
57 This allows that all else being equal, they could sometimes be motivated by an action because they 
thought it was good. However, whenever there was a conflict between maximizing their positive bodily 
states and doing what they thought was virtuous, the former would win out. Moreover, as we shall see, 
because non-philosophers have a superficial conception of virtue, they do not have the proper conception of 
virtue, and so, fail to see the value in it. 
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philosophers call the same actions ‘courageous’ and the same actions ‘temperate’, there is 
widespread agreement about what these virtues are.58 Thus, in general non-philosophers 
will recognize when someone acts virtuously. But by the same token, they will recognize 
when someone fails to act virtuously or acts viciously. And for this reason, it seems that 
all people with apparent virtue would have to take into account whether or not a 
prospective action is virtuous when they go about performing their hedonic calculation. 
After all, painful legal punishments or negative social repercussions could follow any 
vicious action.59 Thus, in order to engage in profitable exchanges, people with apparent 
virtue would have to be sensitive to what is called ‘virtue’ and would typically have to act 
in accordance with what they believe is virtuous. So, I suggest that it is not only possible 
that people with apparent virtue conceive of their actions as virtuous and value virtue 
instrumentally, both must be the norm among them. 
 If this is correct, then there seem to be striking similarities between the sort of 
virtue that Plato ascribes to the best of non-philosophers and the most well-known 
hedonist of antiquity, or any era, Epicurus. We know from his extant works and from 
reports of his views that Epicurus advised honoring virtues only if they bring pleasure, 
                                                
58 In light of this agreement, it seems that non-philosophers are not subjectivists. Indeed, although they are 
hedonistic and accept that pleasure is the standard of value, they do not seem to think that their own 
pleasure determines what is virtuous. This does, however, leave open the possibility that they are relativists 
of one stripe or another. 
59 As we have seen, according to Socrates, honor lovers act temperately for fear of negative social 
repercussions for failing to do so (82c5-6). Moreover, in his speech Protagoras recommends that one claim 
to be just even if one is unjust, stressing the negative consequences for acting unjustly and being exposed as 
vicious. 
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but saying ‘goodbye’ to them if they did not.60 Further, Epicureans portrayed the virtues 
as slaves to pleasure, with the sole function of guarding a person from pain or alerting her 
when a potential action might have negative social consequences.61 Despite this 
disdainful attitude toward virtues, Epicurus thought one should always perform virtuous 
action. For, he believed that no one could ever be completely confident that her vicious 
actions would remain concealed.62 Thus, on his view virtue is not intrinsically valuable, 
but it is instrumentally valuable, in particular, in helping one to avoid pain. It seems to 
me that this is the very sort of attitude that Plato attributes to the best of the non-
philosophers in the Phaedo, namely those with apparent virtue.   
 So, Plato attributes to non-philosophers a sophisticated form of deficient virtue in 
the Phaedo. But what does he think about those people who possess it? Based on what 
we have seen, Plato does not have a wholly negative view of those with apparent virtue, 
despite his appraisal of this condition in comparison to genuine virtue. To begin with, 
people with apparent virtue do avoid vicious action and perform virtuous actions. 
Although they do not act for the correct reasons, this does not make their actions 
worthless.63 After all, whatever their reasons, people with apparent virtue can typically be 
counted on to do the right thing in many situations, especially in a city with decent laws 
and law enforcement. And those with social virtue in particular can be counted on to 
                                                
60 LS 21M. Note that we find a similar phrase employed in the Phaedo. In particular, see 82d1, where the 
philosophers “says ‘goodbye’” to bodily concerns. 
61 LS 21O. 
62 LS 22A. 
63 Pace Kraut 2010, 54-55. As noted above (fn. 29), souls in the afterlife are rewarded for their good 
actions, despite their base motivations.   
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contribute to the harmony of the city. Moreover, as I have argued, the apparently virtuous 
act well because of something about themselves, namely control over their passions. 
However, by locating value only in the bodily, no matter how much control they have 
over their passions or how many virtuous actions they perform, non-philosophers can at 
best only have a sort of counterfeit virtue.  
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